ISO/IEC 30111
vulnerability handling standard for PSIRT and product security teams
ISO/IEC 30111:2019 (Information technology, Security techniques, Vulnerability handling processes) is the international standard for the internal-handling half of vulnerability disclosure. It describes how a vendor that has received a vulnerability report (or surfaced one through internal discovery) operates the internal triage, the root-cause analysis, the fix development, the regression testing, and the release-readiness sign-off that produce the remediation the disclosure record commits to. The standard pairs with ISO/IEC 29147 (Vulnerability disclosure), which covers the externally facing half. It is the operating reference the EU Cyber Resilience Act, the CISA Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure model, the FIRST PSIRT Services Framework, and the ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A control set read against. This page covers the four-phase handling cycle, the policy and operating-record set, the failure modes the standard surfaces, the relationship with adjacent regimes, and the audit-grade evidence pack the programme produces.
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ISO/IEC 30111 explained for product security and PSIRT teams
ISO/IEC 30111:2019 (Information technology, Security techniques, Vulnerability handling processes) is the international standard for the internal-handling half of vulnerability disclosure. It describes how an organisation that produces software, hardware, or services operates the internal triage, the root-cause analysis, the fix development, the regression testing, and the release-readiness sign-off that produce the remediation the disclosure side commits to. The standard names the policy, the case register, the verification clocks, the remediation discipline, the regression evidence, and the post-release tracking, and it pairs explicitly with ISO/IEC 29147 (Vulnerability disclosure) which covers the external-facing counterpart.
For PSIRT teams, product security teams at vendors, AppSec teams accountable for fixing externally reported and internally discovered issues, GRC owners producing the audit pack, and CISOs at organisations that ship products read against by federal, EU, financial, or critical-infrastructure regulators, ISO/IEC 30111 is the operating reference the engineering-side discipline reads against. The standard is the international anchor that the EU Cyber Resilience Act, the CISA Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure model, the FIRST PSIRT Services Framework, and the ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A 8.8 control on management of technical vulnerabilities all inherit from on the handling side.
This page walks through the scope of the standard, the four phases of the handling cycle, the operating-record artefacts the standard expects, the failure modes the standard was published to surface, the relationship with adjacent regimes, the audit-grade evidence pack the programme produces, and where ISO/IEC 30111 sits alongside the PSIRT operating workflow, the vulnerability disclosure programme management workflow, and the vulnerability disclosure programme setup guide. Programmes that adopt ISO/IEC 30111 as the internal-handling reference and ISO/IEC 29147 as the disclosure-side counterpart produce a coherent vulnerability operating posture that holds up under EU CRA, CISA CVD, FIRST PSIRT, federal mandate, ISO/IEC 27001, SOC 2, and audit-committee scrutiny on one record.
What ISO/IEC 30111 covers
The standard is narrower than the full vulnerability lifecycle and broader than a single process template. It covers the internally facing half of vulnerability disclosure; ISO/IEC 29147 covers the external-facing half. The two read together as a pair, with the same case identifier walking across both records.
Internal vulnerability handling
ISO/IEC 30111 is the internal-handling half of the vulnerability disclosure pair. The standard describes how a vendor that has accepted a vulnerability report (whether external or internal in origin) operates the triage, the verification, the root-cause analysis, the fix development, the regression testing, and the release-readiness sign-off that produce the remediation. It is the operating reference behind the engineering work the disclosure side reads against.
Process discipline rather than tooling
The standard is deliberately tool-agnostic. It names what the handling process must produce (a documented policy, a case register, a verification record, a remediation trail, a regression artefact, a release-readiness sign-off, a post-release tracking record) rather than the specific software a vendor uses to operate it. Programmes that adopt the standard pair it with whichever workspace, ticketing, code repository, or document system already carries the rest of the security operating record.
Pairs with ISO/IEC 29147
ISO/IEC 30111 covers the internal handling. ISO/IEC 29147 covers the external interface (intake from finders, communication with finders, advisory publication, coordination with external bodies). The two standards are designed to be operated together; the same case identifier walks across both records. Programmes that adopt one without the other produce either an external promise without an internal capability or an internal capability with no defensible external interface.
The four phases of the handling cycle
ISO/IEC 30111 describes the handling cycle in four phases. The phases are not separate processes; they are stages on the same case record, each with named outputs the next phase reads against. Read sequentially: receipt produces the intake record, verification produces the calibrated finding, remediation produces the fix and the affected-version matrix, and release readiness plus post-release tracking produce the deployment evidence, the post-release advisory updates, and the lessons-learned record.
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Phase 1: Receipt and intake handling
The internal record opens the case, captures the source (external finder via the ISO/IEC 29147 intake channel, coordinator referral, internal discovery from red team or pentest, code scanning, dependency analysis, fuzzing, telemetry, or customer support escalation, or a supplier advisory), assigns the named handling owner, references the ISO/IEC 29147 disclosure record where applicable, and starts the documented internal handling clock. The intake record is the canonical artefact every later phase reads against rather than a forwarded email or a chat thread.
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Phase 2: Verification and assessment
The handler verifies the report. Verification confirms the affected product and version, reproduces the issue in a controlled environment, captures the technical evidence, calibrates a working severity (typically CVSS 3.1 or 4.0 with environmental modifiers and an internal exploitability rating where appropriate), maps to the affected components and shipping branches, and records the verification status against the documented clock. Verification is the gate that turns an inbound report into a tracked finding the engineering organisation reads against.
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Phase 3: Remediation development
The handler coordinates the technical fix. The remediation may be a code patch, a configuration change, a cryptographic rotation, an ecosystem-coordinated dependency update, a workaround for unsupported branches, an upstream-supplier fix, or, where the issue is not exploitable in shipped products, a documented advisory with no code change. The phase carries the regression evidence, the affected-version matrix, the backport decisions, the customer-facing impact assessment, and the release-readiness sign-off the disclosure side will publish against.
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Phase 4: Release readiness and post-release tracking
The handler delivers the remediation to the disclosure side for advisory publication and customer notification, records the release timestamp against the agreed embargo, and keeps the case open for the post-release window. Post-release tracking captures the deployment evidence, the regression observation, the exploit-in-the-wild observation where applicable, the advisory updates, and the lessons-learned summary that feeds the quarterly programme review.
The operating-record artefact set
The standard expects a defined artefact set rather than a single document. The pack below is the minimum durable set most programmes maintain when they adopt ISO/IEC 30111 as the operating baseline. Each artefact has a named owner, a refresh cadence, and a version history so reconstruction at audit time is replaced with a continuous operating trail.
- A documented vulnerability handling policy that names the scope (which products, services, internal discovery sources, and supplier advisories are in scope), the named accountable owner, the handling clocks (acknowledgement, verification, remediation target by severity, release-readiness sign-off, post-release tracking window), the decision authority (who approves a release, who approves a workaround, who approves a no-fix advisory), and the integration points with the ISO/IEC 29147 disclosure side. The policy is version-controlled and dated.
- A case register with one record per handled vulnerability, walking from intake through verification, triage, remediation, regression, release readiness, release delivery, and the post-release tracking window. Each record carries the timestamps that prove the policy clocks were held against rather than reconstructed at audit time.
- A verification record per case with the reproduction steps, the controlled environment evidence, the working severity vector, the affected-component reference, the affected branch matrix, and the named verifier. The verification record is the artefact a downstream auditor reads when asking how the vendor decided what to fix.
- A remediation record per case with the fix description, the regression evidence, the affected-version matrix, the backport decisions, the customer-facing impact assessment, the release-readiness sign-off, and the references to the code change, the configuration change, or the upstream supplier fix.
- A release-readiness sign-off captured against the case record by the named decider (usually the product security owner, the engineering owner, and the release engineering owner). The sign-off names the release window, the embargo posture, the affected-version matrix, the customer-communication plan, and the rollback or recall plan if material new information emerges post-release.
- A post-release tracking record per case with the deployment evidence (release notes, advisory cross-reference, customer notification log), the regression observation, the exploit-in-the-wild observation where applicable, the advisory updates if material new information emerges, and the lessons-learned summary that feeds the post-mortem and the quarterly programme review.
- A supplier and supply-chain handling record for cases originating from upstream advisories, with the supplier reference, the affected internal product matrix, the upstream fix availability, the local mitigation pending upstream remediation, and the customer-facing communication where the vendor product depends on the upstream fix.
- A metric pack the handling programme reports against the policy clocks: time-to-acknowledgement, time-to-verification, time-to-remediation by severity, time-to-release-readiness, post-release advisory update rate, internal-discovery rate vs externally reported rate, and supplier-advisory ingest cadence.
Failure modes the standard is designed to surface
The standard is forgiving on the choice of tooling, the wording of the policy, and the prioritisation order within the case register. It is unforgiving about a small number of patterns that turn the handling programme cosmetic rather than operational. The patterns below recur across vulnerability handling adoptions and are the ones that erode engineering confidence and audit defensibility most reliably.
- Treating handling as a ticket rather than a case. Programmes that open a generic engineering ticket without a structured handling record lose the verification evidence, the affected-branch matrix, the regression artefact, and the release-readiness sign-off. The standard expects a case-shaped record with named owners and explicit clocks rather than a free-form ticket that could be a feature request, a bug, or a security case.
- No verification clock. Reports that move from intake straight to fix without a recorded verification step lose the prioritisation rationale and produce remediations that the disclosure side cannot describe to downstream consumers. The standard expects an explicit verification clock, captured in the policy, communicated to the finder side at acknowledgement, and held against on the case record.
- Skipping the working severity. Programmes that go straight from verification to fix without recording a working severity (typically CVSS 3.1 or 4.0 with environmental modifiers and an internal exploitability rating) lose the prioritisation rationale, lose the cross-case comparison, and produce advisories the disclosure side cannot calibrate against. The severity is captured at verification and refined as the case develops.
- Remediation without regression evidence. Fixes that ship without recorded regression evidence (test pass, scanner re-run, manual verification artefact) leave the audit reader without the proof the fix worked. The standard expects the regression artefact attached to the case record, not produced at audit time from build logs.
- Release-readiness sign-off in chat. Programmes that approve a release in chat or email rather than against the case record lose the named decider, the timestamp, the rationale, and the trail an internal auditor or external auditor can reconstruct. The sign-off lives on the record.
- Internal-discovery cases on a separate track. Programmes that handle externally reported cases against 30111 but route internal-discovery cases (red team, pentest, code scanning, dependency analysis, fuzzing) through a different process produce two operating standards instead of one. The standard is explicit that internal-discovery cases follow the same handling discipline, and the unified record is the evidence the same standard applies regardless of source.
- No post-release tracking. Programmes that close the case at release miss the deployment evidence, the regression observation, the exploit-in-the-wild observation, and the lessons-learned record. The standard expects the case to remain open through the post-release window with the operational learning captured against the record.
How ISO/IEC 30111 relates to adjacent regimes
ISO/IEC 30111 sits in a busy disclosure neighbourhood. The relationships below are the ones programmes encounter most often when they read 30111 against the rest of the operating regime. Programmes operating across regions and sectors use 30111 as the internal-handling spine and read ISO/IEC 29147, the FIRST PSIRT Services Framework, the EU CRA, CISA CVD, and ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A 8.8 as the contextual layers around it.
ISO/IEC 30111 vs ISO/IEC 29147
ISO/IEC 30111 (Vulnerability handling processes) is the internal-handling counterpart. ISO/IEC 29147 (Vulnerability disclosure) is the external-facing standard. 30111 governs the triage, the verification, the fix development, the regression, and the release readiness. 29147 governs the policy, the intake, the finder communications, and the advisory. The two are designed to be operated together; the same case identifier walks across both records, with 30111-side artefacts being the internal operating record and 29147-side artefacts being the externally visible interface.
ISO/IEC 30111 vs the FIRST PSIRT Services Framework
FIRST publishes the PSIRT Services Framework, which describes the services a Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is expected to deliver across vulnerability discovery, analysis, remediation, and disclosure. The PSIRT Services Framework is service-oriented; ISO/IEC 30111 is process-oriented. PSIRTs operating to FIRST guidance read 30111 as the internal-handling process the PSIRT services framework calls into for the engineering-side workstreams.
ISO/IEC 30111 vs the EU Cyber Resilience Act
The EU Cyber Resilience Act obliges manufacturers placing products with digital elements on the EU market to address vulnerabilities without undue delay, provide security updates, and maintain the technical documentation that demonstrates the vulnerability handling process. ISO/IEC 30111 is the international standard the CRA expectations read against on the internal-handling side. Vendors operating CRA-aware programmes use 30111 as the operating reference and the documented 30111 case register as evidence the CRA handling obligation is being met.
ISO/IEC 30111 vs ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A
ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A controls A.5.7 (threat intelligence), A.5.27 (learning from information security incidents), A.5.28 (collection of evidence), A.6.7 (remote working), A.5.36 (compliance with policies, rules, and standards), and A.8.8 (management of technical vulnerabilities) all read against the same operating discipline 30111 names. Programmes that adopt 30111 as the vulnerability handling reference produce the evidence A.8.8 expects, and the case register feeds the wider ISMS audit cycle.
ISO/IEC 30111 vs CISA Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD)
CISA CVD is the US government coordinated disclosure model. CVD describes the multi-stakeholder communication discipline; ISO/IEC 30111 describes the vendor-side internal handling. Programmes that operate against the CVD model read 30111 as the engineering-side operating reference behind the cases CVD coordinates and 29147 as the disclosure-side counterpart.
ISO/IEC 30111 vs the US Federal vulnerability disclosure mandates
CISA Binding Operational Directive 20-01, OMB M-20-32, and the related federal-civilian executive expectations require federal agencies and federal-acquisition contractors to operate published vulnerability disclosure policies. The disclosure side reads against ISO/IEC 29147; the internal handling that produces the remediation reads against ISO/IEC 30111. Federal contractors operating both standards as the operating baseline produce one artefact set that satisfies multiple regulatory readers.
The audit-grade evidence pack
Internal auditors, ISO/IEC 27001 certification bodies reading Annex A controls A.5.7 (threat intelligence), A.5.27 (learning from information security incidents), A.5.28 (collection of evidence), A.5.36 (compliance with policies, rules, and standards), and A.8.8 (management of technical vulnerabilities), federal customers under FedRAMP and NIST SP 800-171, financial regulators under DORA Article 28, EU market surveillance under CRA, and PSIRT programmes operating to FIRST guidance all read handling evidence in similar shapes. The minimum durable pack below is the residue of the operating work rather than a separate compilation produced at reading time.
- A case register with one record per handled vulnerability, walking from intake through verification, triage, remediation, regression, release readiness, release delivery, and the post-release tracking window. Each record carries the timestamps that prove the policy clocks were held against rather than reconstructed at audit time.
- A verification record per case with the reproduction steps, the controlled environment evidence, the working severity vector, the affected-component reference, the affected branch matrix, and the named verifier. The verification record is the artefact a downstream auditor reads when asking how the vendor decided what to fix.
- A remediation record per case with the fix description, the regression evidence, the affected-version matrix, the backport decisions, the customer-facing impact assessment, the release-readiness sign-off, and the references to the code change, the configuration change, or the upstream supplier fix.
- A release-readiness sign-off captured against the case record by the named decider (usually the product security owner, the engineering owner, and the release engineering owner). The sign-off names the release window, the embargo posture, the affected-version matrix, the customer-communication plan, and the rollback or recall plan if material new information emerges post-release.
- A post-release tracking record per case with the deployment evidence (release notes, advisory cross-reference, customer notification log), the regression observation, the exploit-in-the-wild observation where applicable, the advisory updates if material new information emerges, and the lessons-learned summary that feeds the post-mortem and the quarterly programme review.
- A supplier and supply-chain handling record for cases originating from upstream advisories, with the supplier reference, the affected internal product matrix, the upstream fix availability, the local mitigation pending upstream remediation, and the customer-facing communication where the vendor product depends on the upstream fix.
- A metric pack the handling programme reports against the policy clocks: time-to-acknowledgement, time-to-verification, time-to-remediation by severity, time-to-release-readiness, post-release advisory update rate, internal-discovery rate vs externally reported rate, and supplier-advisory ingest cadence.
Where SecPortal fits in an ISO/IEC 30111 programme
SecPortal is the operating layer for the vulnerability handling case lifecycle, not a replacement for the policy hierarchy, the engineering ownership model, or the release engineering discipline that the standard expects. The platform handles the case-side workstreams (intake, verification, triage, remediation, regression evidence, release readiness, post-release tracking) so the artefacts the policy commits to are produced as structured records rather than reconstructed across email threads, ticketing systems, and document drives at audit time. The same workspace that hosts the handling case hosts the SAST, dependency analysis, authenticated DAST, external scanning, and continuous monitoring evidence the verification and regression phases depend on.
- Engagement management dedicated to the vulnerability handling programme, with one engagement record per handled case so the intake, the verification, the remediation, the release-readiness sign-off, and the post-release tracking sit on one record rather than being stitched together at audit time across email threads, ticketing systems, and document drives.
- Findings management with CVSS 3.1 scoring, CWE tagging, and 300+ structured finding templates so the working severity, the affected-component reference, the affected-branch matrix, and the recommended remediation are captured against the case record rather than recomputed when the disclosure side drafts the advisory.
- Document management for the published handling policy, the verification artefacts, the regression evidence, the release-readiness sign-off documents, the post-release write-ups, and the supplier-advisory references, with version history per artefact so the policy refresh and the post-release advisory updates produce a defensible audit trail.
- Code scanning with Semgrep-based SAST and dependency analysis that surfaces internal-discovery cases into the same workspace the externally reported cases live in, so internal and external discovery feed one handling pipeline rather than two parallel ones with different operating disciplines.
- Repository connections via GitHub, GitLab, and Bitbucket OAuth so the case record references the affected repository, the fix commit, the affected branches, the backport branches, and the release tag rather than holding the references in a separate spreadsheet.
- Authenticated DAST (cookie, bearer, basic, form) and external scanning that produce the verification evidence, the regression evidence after the fix, and the post-release tracking observation against the same engagement record the case opened on.
- AI report generation that turns the handling case record into the verification summary, the post-release write-up, the supplier-advisory ingest summary, and the quarterly programme review, working against the structured finding rather than against unstructured email content.
- Activity log with CSV export that captures every state change on a handling case (intake, verification, owner reassignment, severity adjustment, fix commit reference, regression artefact attachment, release-readiness sign-off, post-release tracking update), so an internal auditor or external auditor can reconstruct the handling timeline without a multi-team excavation.
- Team management with role-based access (owner, admin, member, viewer, billing) that keeps the PSIRT, AppSec, product engineering, release engineering, customer support, and legal teams on the same workspace with appropriate scoping per role, plus MFA enforcement (TOTP) for accounts that touch the handling record.
- Notifications and alerts that fire on case state changes (verification completed, fix attached, release-readiness sign-off requested, post-release window expiring) so the programme operates against the policy clocks rather than relying on inbox vigilance.
- Compliance tracking that reads the same evidence pack across ISO/IEC 30111, ISO/IEC 29147, the FIRST PSIRT Services Framework, the CISA CVD model, the EU CRA handling obligations, and ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A 8.8, so the cross-regime read is reconcilable rather than reconciled per audit.
- Encrypted credential storage (AES-256-GCM) for any privileged credentials needed during verification or regression, so the verification evidence is reproducible without leaving credentials in shared documents.
The handling-side evidence (intake, verification, remediation, release readiness, post-release tracking) reads against operational workflows that already exist as named use cases. The PSIRT operating workflow carries the case-management discipline the handling record reads against. The vulnerability disclosure programme management workflow carries the published policy, the intake channel, and the finder-relationship operating trail that pairs with the handling side. The zero-day and emergency vulnerability response workflow carries the accelerated handling path for cases where the standard handling clock has to be compressed and an emergency release is required.
For internal security teams operating ISO/IEC 30111 as part of the wider product security baseline, the product security teams workspace bundles the platform with the engagement structure the handling cadence reads against. For GRC and compliance teams reading the handling evidence against ISO/IEC 27001, SOC 2, EU CRA, and the federal mandates, the GRC and compliance teams workspace covers the policy hierarchy, the evidence pack, and the audit cadence the standard expects. For CISOs and security leaders carrying the programme-level reporting on the handling posture, the CISOs and security leaders workspace covers the executive-layer reporting model that sits on top of the handling operating record.
For deeper reading on the disciplines this standard reads against, the ISO/IEC 29147 framework page covers the disclosure-side counterpart that 30111 pairs with. The EU Cyber Resilience Act framework page covers the regulation that operationalises the ISO/IEC 30111 expectations for manufacturers placing products with digital elements on the EU market. The EU Cyber Resilience Act vulnerability handling guide covers the practical handling-side walkthrough the regulation expects. The CVE Numbering Authority guide covers the CVE issuance discipline that pairs with the handling and disclosure cycles. The VEX guide covers the exploitability-statement artefact paired with SBOM that downstream consumers read alongside the advisory. The ISO 27001 framework page covers the wider ISMS context the handling programme sits inside, with Annex A 8.8 as the direct control read. The ISO/IEC 27035 framework page covers the information security incident management counterpart that completes the ISO incident-and-disclosure trio for vendors that both ship products and operate ISMS-grade incident response.
Key control areas
SecPortal helps you track and manage compliance across these domains.
Phase 1: Receipt and intake handling
The internal record opens the case, captures the source (external finder, coordinator, internal discovery, supplier advisory), assigns the named handling owner, references the ISO/IEC 29147 disclosure record where applicable, and starts the internal handling clock. The intake record is the canonical artefact every later phase reads against rather than a forwarded email or a chat thread.
Phase 2: Verification and assessment
The handler verifies the report, reproduces the issue against the affected product and version in a controlled environment, captures the technical evidence, calibrates a working severity (CVSS 3.1 or 4.0 with environmental modifiers, internal exploitability rating where appropriate), maps to the affected components and shipping branches, and records the verification status against the documented clock. Verification is the gate that turns an inbound report into a tracked finding the engineering organisation reads against.
Phase 3: Remediation development
The handler coordinates the technical fix. The fix may be a code patch, a configuration change, a cryptographic rotation, an ecosystem-coordinated dependency update, a workaround for unsupported branches, or a documented advisory with no code change where the issue is not exploitable in shipped products. The phase carries the regression evidence, the affected-version matrix, the backport decisions, the customer-facing impact assessment, and the release-readiness sign-off the disclosure side will publish.
Phase 4: Release readiness and post-release tracking
The handler delivers the remediation to the disclosure side for advisory publication and customer notification, records the release timestamp against the agreed embargo, and keeps the case open for the post-release window. Post-release tracking captures the deployment evidence, the regression observation, the exploit-in-the-wild observation where applicable, the advisory updates, and the lessons-learned summary that feeds the quarterly programme review.
Pairing with ISO/IEC 29147
ISO/IEC 30111 covers the internal handling. ISO/IEC 29147 covers the external interface (intake from finders, communication with finders, advisory publication, coordination with external bodies). The two standards are designed to be operated together; the same case identifier walks across both records. Programmes that adopt one without the other produce either an external promise without an internal capability or an internal capability with no defensible external interface.
Internal-discovery handling
The standard explicitly covers vulnerabilities surfaced by the vendor itself (red team, internal pentest, code scanning, dependency analysis, fuzzing, telemetry, customer support escalation) alongside externally reported cases. Internal-discovery cases follow the same triage, fix, regression, and release-readiness path. The unified handling record is the audit evidence that the same discipline applies whether the source was a finder report or an internal scan.
Supplier and supply-chain handling
The standard accounts for vulnerabilities in upstream components (third-party libraries, OEM modules, SaaS providers, hardware components). The handling record captures the supplier advisory reference, the affected internal product matrix, the upstream fix availability, the local mitigation pending upstream remediation, and the customer-facing communication where the vendor product depends on the upstream fix.
Audit evidence the programme produces
The minimum durable pack is the published handling policy with version history, the case register with one record per handled vulnerability, the verification evidence per case, the remediation record with regression and affected-version matrix, the release-readiness sign-off, the post-release tracking record, and the metric pack reporting against the policy clocks. The pack is the residue of the operating work rather than a separate compilation produced at audit time.
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